phase 1
To return to the first phase-those twenty-eight fateful weeks from June 30, 1960: Frederick Cooper phrased it well when he noted that decolonization was a "drama of competing visions " (2008:176) . 6 Within that drama, the power of the departing colonial state was just sufficient to be able to shut down those competing visions but insufficient to dictate a clear resolution. Indeed, the departing colonial state had an agenda of its own, but one that was so manifestly opposed to the immediate well-being of the people that it was rejected by them. Similarly, the people had sufficient organization to reject colonial agendas but insufficient political coherence to resolve the challenges on their own. For that they needed the state. But popular control of the state apparatus was an elusive aspiration; the tragedy of the Congo has been that the state has never been aligned with the people for long. Indeed, for much of postcolonial history the practices of the state have often been antithetical to the interests of the people; even during the hopeful days tied to independence, exuberance trumped execution. The only means available for narrowing that gap was for individuals to join the state-and in so doing to augment the size of the elite class, leaving intact the class structure in all its monstrous proportions. In very different ways, that process of expanding the ruling class was represented in both the frenetic energy of the second phase, with the twenty-one provincettes, each with its associated provincial elites, and in the third phase, with the co-optation that occurred under Mobutu's rule. However, rather than narrowing, the gap between state authorities and the people on the ground only widened, even as the numbers of those with some tentative economic security increased-if only ephemerally.
The first phase was brief but crucial. It was the only time during the past fifty years when there was meaningful hope of aligning the state with the needs and aspirations of the people (see Young 1965; Lemarchand 1964; Weiss 1967) . But within two weeks of the formal declaration of independence, the newly installed government was faced with a mutiny of the army (as enlisted men protested the continuing racial exclusivity of the Belgian officer corps), a flight of virtually the entire administrative cadre retained after independence, an attack on the country by Belgian naval units at Matadi (claiming to assist Belgian administrative flight), and the secession of Katanga, its wealthiest region (responsible for 60% of foreign exchange earnings). So the newly "independent" Congo was left without an effective army, a functioning administration, or any significant financial resources. As Larry Devlin's (2007) memoire of the period makes vividly clear, a crucial region of the country had seceded with Belgian support, and increasingly insecure politicians turned to outside support. 7 These events, and the international response to them, represented not just the dashing of high hopes; at another level, they attested to the theft of any possibility of addressing them in a structured fashion on the part of the people in the Congo.
phase 2
Such devastating disillusion with the central state led people to turn to the local context in an attempt to redefine their own "Second Independence"-one that would usher in a period in which the wealth of the country would devolve to the people, housing would materialize, education would be available, jobs would be created, and salaries would be decent: in short, a period in which the inequities of eighty years of intrusive colonial power would be righted. In the colonial matrix (as also in the quasicolonial matrix that followed decolonization), wealth, jobs, and education were all associated with the state, so the struggle focused on the control of state resources.
But what began as a struggle for the state ended with the struggle to rectify past wrongs-to undo the inequities of a colonial state in which some benefited at the expense of others. Thus the struggle for a "Second Independence" was a struggle for an ideological vision of restructuring the relations of the state to the people through the process of popular mobilization against those who had thwarted the original goals of independence. In many areas this struggle turned inward, with violence directed against local beneficiaries of state positions. Indeed, many local conflicts became focused on redefining the contorted colonial structures of power which local beneficiaries of this "faux" decolonization process, by their actions since independence, had sought to extend. 8 Yet the huge gap between power and authority remained. It isn't surprising that many of the struggles that continue today are the struggles of these competing legitimacies-struggles which, as Severine Autesserre (2010) reminds us, are often fought out at the local level, in a format reminiscent of the struggles forty years ago. 9
phase 3
With the reestablishment of repression from November 24, 1965, the date of Mobutu's second coup, the vision shifted-but only momentarily. Originally the coup was popular, for with Mobutu's promise of peace-and his inflated rhetoric of returning the state to the people-hope had returned. But such hope lasted for only a few years. By the early 1970s the penetration of the state to the local areas had become evident, and its major goal had become clear-not to narrow the gap between people and power, but to preserve the privileges of those in power. From 1973, with first the disastrous "Zaireanization" of the economy (by which expatriate-owned commercial, agricultural, and corporate enterprises were turned over to Zairean nationals, irrespective of their qualifications) and then, a year later, with the "radicalization" of the economy (with the state taking over the now hollowed-out, defunct enterprises), followed by the precipitous decline of global copper commodity prices on which the patronage of the state depended, the national economy was effectively destroyed, barely cobbled together by arbitrary allotments from the Presidential Office. But even these distributions diminished over time. By the late 1970s the balance had shifted from a patrimonial state to a predatory one, and the people had to resort to local creativity-now celebrated as "the second economy" (MacGaffey 1987). 10 But while the creativity of the people was indeed worth celebrating, most observers failed to notice that this form of economic creativity emerged because of the total failure of the state to ensure national economic structures accessible to all. Furthermore, the creativity of the people was matched by the mutation of the state back to the colonial vision of raw extraction-this time not through administrative power, which might have assured the development of the corporate economy, but by police power, which only abetted individual aggrandizement. As one observer (C. Newbury 1984a) phrased the question: was the state defunct, or had it just gone underground?
So the third phase-the long phase of Mobutu's "Second Republic"-mocked the earlier two: while it started in hope, it all too quickly mutated into repression. And repression again brought new initiatives at the local level. Demanding payment for illegally seized property, people demonstrated on the steps of local authorities, engaging in a politics of personal shaming. To protest the crumbling public works infrastructure, citizenswomen and well as men-refused to pay taxes, in a gesture of political withdrawal (see Nzongola-Ntalaja 1984; C. Newbury 1984b) . To resolve disputes, ajudicants went not to state courts but to their parish elders, part of the extensive Catholic Church networks which, in the absence of the state, remained the only truly national political institution-along with the intense national pride in Congolese music (see White 2008) . In Bukavu in the late 1980s Mobutu was publicly humiliated when he attempted to engage in "dialogue" with the people; having had enough of such a one-way "dialogue" with state power, the people turned the encounter into an interrogation of Mobutu. There followed a torrent of demands from below-from the local level-effectively indicting the state on many grounds, exposing the bankruptcy of the state not just in material terms, but in political and moral terms as well. These demands culminated in the monumental constitutional convention, the Conférence Nationale Souveraine, which convened in 1991 and brought together some twenty-eight hundred delegates to reexamine and reconstruct the entire constitutional basis of the state (see Nzongola-Ntalaja 2002:189-98; 2004) . 11 Nonetheless, massive as it was, this initiative, too, was thwarted by its own internal dissention and by Mobutu's adroit manipulations. Once again, politics was able to subvert but not eliminate the aspirations of the people to construct a new order; the energies and inspiration of the people were not sufficient to overcome the power of the state and the cunning of its power holders.
From about 1990, however, new developments also occurred in the international domain. With the collapse of the USSR, Cold War alliances were no longer necessary. Within the new parameters Mobutu's steadfast support from abroad evaporated, as "human rights" and "democratization" became the favored watchwords of Western diplomacy, replacing political stability and economic access as the key factors by which the West related to Mobutu's regime. The effect was monumental for Mobutu, who found himself lacking the external support that had for so long propped up his corrupt regime militarily, financially, and diplomatically. But it meant less for the people, as external resources that formerly had provided for a reliable client were not redirected toward ameliorating the pain he had caused within Zaire. 12 Once again, the people were left on their own; although the CSN represented new political energy from below, little had changed for the people on the ground.
phase 4
Despite the misery of the final years of Mobutu's vaunted Second Republic, the most recent phase has proved even more discouraging. The arrival of a million refugees from Rwanda in 1994 initially reinforced Mobutu's position, as he adroitly turned human catastrophe into his own political advantage, once again, in obtaining external support. The subsequent invasion of the Congo by a series of outside forces led by Rwanda, first in 1996 and later in 1998, initially brought about the overthrow of Mobutu and his replacement by Laurent Kabila, but quickly turned into an external occupation of the eastern third of the country and the extraction of massive amounts of raw materials that were used (in part) to sustain the occupation. Although the presence of these troops was nominally intended to defend targeted minorities within the Congo, in fact these surrogate regimes had virtually no effective ties on the ground. Local militias, originally formed to defend Congolese territory, ended up with a plethora of agendas of their own (often replicating the divisions of phase 2), and the east turned into a vast domain of displacement, insecurity, and death on a massive scale. 13 Now the people are demoralized, vulnerable, and abandoned by the state, which is disdained universally. With the return of the provincette-like structures under the rubric of decentralization, many more people have been incorporated into provincial legislatures and administration. Yet for most people state structures are, once again, to be avoided where possible and deferred to only when necessary. Again, everything is a potential target for extraction-for those who can extract. At the local level (at least in the east), financial demands proliferate, including new market taxes, gasoline taxes ("paid for" by the simple extraction of gas), extra fees (or favors) for school attendance, required "gifts" to obtain medical care (with supplies and food remaining the patients' own responsibility), additional fees to secure essential documentation-or even for permission to collect firewood-all to benefit not the state but prebendal power holders. This is a familiar pattern in the Congo, reminiscent of the local-level struggles of the second phase. But whereas the second phase was marked by military violence against the state officials, this phase reverses that script. The primary feature of today's struggle is the structural violence by state officials against the people at the local level, as political culture at every level is marked by appalling venality. So the decolonization of the Congo has indeed led to struggle-a struggle between local-level solutions and state-level predation, with the extraction of the state actors operating at increasingly lower levels.
Conclusion
The answers cannot come from within; that is clear. Nor will they come from a weakened, distracted, and indifferent international community, as has been shown many times over-from the extraction of neighboring states, to the incoherence of U.N. presence, to the rigid structural demands of the International Financial Institutions. Caught up as it is in the political culture of state, international involvement has consistently been part of the problem for people on the ground, not a source of resolution.
With civil society prostrate, state actors intent in their own enrichment, and the international community distracted, new hope for any answers can only come from the diaspora community and their allies abroad. I am not suggesting that diaspora members return to Congo-they would likely not have a great deal of influence there, for many reasons. Instead, I am simply noting that diaspora members and their allies can exert influence from abroad, not only in aiding with material resources, but especially in serving as catalysts in the formulation of a viable national vision challenging the venality of current political culture, insisting that public resources be used for public purposes, and creating space for local people to act on those principles.
It must be acknowledged, however, that the diaspora community is divided against itself. It is worth asking therefore if its members care to make a difference, or if they simply wish to invest in such a way that reinforces the existing power structures-to extend and deepen, and make more intractable, the penetration of state extraction. Are they to serve as an arm of the state, or as a forum for interrogating the state? From experience elsewhere, it is clear that by "investing" in entrepreneurial schemes in Africa, diaspora community members can be, and often are, part of the problem, not part of the solution. For "investing" in Africa is an ambiguous concept: it can refer to a long-term commitment to transform societal processes to meet local objectives, but as a strategy for a quick financial return, "investment" can also be simply a euphemism for more effective extraction. Not a few people confuse the two, using the discourse of the former role to act in the latter role; semantics matter.
So is the claim of a privileged diaspora status by some anything more than a blatant attempt to set aside a domaine de chasse-an exclusive domain of extraction? Or is the Congolese diaspora capable of actually transforming the country? In the name of "community," do its various members simply seek a bigger slice of the extraction, transforming collective patrimony into personal wealth? To be sure, there have been many honest attempts by exiled individuals to engage directly with the problems of the Congo; but overall the results have been meager from the point of view of social amelioration. What is needed is a firm, consistent, coherent presence by those diaspora members who truly seek to transform the current political culture so that it takes account of collective needs-and takes responsibility for addressing them.
The first three phases of postcolonial Congo have taken us through a period of short-lived inspiration, a period of aspirant revolution, and a period of sustained repression and the loss of a a sense of responsibility of the state toward its own citizens. The results are apparent in the fourth phase: invasion, extraction, and despair. The curse of riches has become the curse of venality-and seems to have no end. But the energy, the intensity, and the hope of the Congolese people still remain. There must be another way out. The diaspora community cannot of course solve all the problems, but its members can conceivably provide visionary and vigorous leadership in allowing the emergence of a more effective political and economic future than the first fifty years of decolonization experiments have shown. Let us hope that such a turnaround will not take another fifty years. But it certainly won't stand a chance without a renewed sense of caring and collective commitment from the outside-to create space for the emergence of new visions from within. 
